Producer Surplus and Subsidization of Pollution Control Device: A Non-Monotonic Relationship
研究发现，对污染控制设备的补贴并不总是单调增加企业利润，因为环境规制可能促使寡头企业合谋，补贴反而用于阻止行业达到更高利润的结果。
Regulators have been concerned with the impact of environmental regulation on the profitability of regulated firms: there have been numerous grants and subsidy programs to reduce the cost of emission control equipment. Intuitively, there should be a monotonically increasing relationship between profits and the amount of subsidization. However, the author shows that this may not be so since regulation may establish a collusive outcome amongst oligopolistic competitors. The role of the subsidization policy may then be seen as the following: given Cournot players, the regulator may subsidize the emission control device to prevent the industry from reaching a profit superior outcome. Copyright 1990 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.