A Spatial Theory of Media Slant and Voter Choice
提出媒体倾向是对政治新闻的系统性过滤，将多维政治简化为选民感知的一维空间，并分析媒体倾向如何影响经济选择与投票行为，发现支持落后者的媒体倾向可能更优。
We develop a theory of media slant as a systematic filtering of political news that reduces multidimensional politics to the one-dimensional space perceived by voters. Economic and political choices are interdependent in our theory: expected electoral results influence economic choices, and economic choices in turn influence voting behaviour. In a two-candidate election, we show that media favouring the front-runner will focus on issues unlikely to deliver a surprise, while media favouring the underdog will gamble for resurrection. We characterize the socially optimal slant and show that it coincides with the one favoured by the underdog under a variety of circumstances. Balanced media, giving each issue equal coverage, may be worse for voters than partisan media.