Mergers and Sunk Costs: An Application to the Ready-Mix Concrete Industry
利用预拌混凝土行业数据估计进入和退出需求阈值，模拟预测从双头垄断到完全垄断的并购会带来9到10年的垄断期，对反垄断政策有参考价值。
Horizontal mergers have a large impact by inducing a long-lasting change in market structure. Only in an industry with substantial entry barriers is a merger not immediately counteracted by post-merger entry. To evaluate the duration of the effects of a merger, I use the model of Abbring and Campbell (2010) to estimate demand thresholds for entry and for exit. These thresholds, along with the process for demand, are estimated using data from the ready-mix concrete industry. Simulations predict that a merger from duopoly to monopoly generates between nine and ten years of monopoly in the market.