Investment Bank Reputation and the Price and Quality of Underwriting Services
研究投资银行声誉与债券承销价格和质量的关系，发现声誉好的银行能降低发行利率但收取更高费用，发行人净收入仍更高，尤其在垃圾债中更明显，表明承销决策反映声誉关切并揭示发行质量。
ABSTRACT The relation between investment bank reputation and the price and quality of bond underwriting services is studied here. After controlling for endogeneity in issuer–underwriter matching, I find that reputable banks obtain lower yields and charge higher fees, but issuers' net proceeds are higher. These relations are pronounced in the junk‐bond category, in which reputable banks' underwriting criteria are most stringent. These findings suggest that banks' underwriting decisions reflect reputation concerns, and are thus informative of issue quality. They also suggest that economic rents are earned on reputation, and thereby provide continued incentives for underwriters to maintain reputation.