Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public‐‐private partnerships
研究了委托公共服务提供中的代理成本，重点分析组织形式与项目实施不确定性的关系，探讨公私合作中捆绑规划与实施在不同情景下的成本收益，并指出私人融资增强捆绑收益的条件。
We study the agency costs of delegated public service provision, focusing on the link between organizational forms and uncertainty at project implementation. We consider a dynamic multitask moral hazard environment where the mapping between effort and performance is ex ante uncertain but new information may arise during operations. Our analysis highlights the costs and benefits that bundling planning and implementation—as under public‐‐private partnerships—can bring in terms of project design and operational costs under various scenarios, possibly allowing for asymmetric information, moral hazard and renegotiation. It also shows that relying on private finance enhances the benefits of bundling only if lenders have enough expertise to assess project risks.