The Optimality of a Simple Market Mechanism
提出一种基于计算机科学算法排序的方法，用于衡量市场机制随规模增大时效率损失下降的速度，并证明k-双拍卖中的单一市场出清价格在所有合理机制中具有最坏情况下的渐近最优性。
Strategic behavior in a finite market can cause inefficiency in the allocation, and market mechanisms differ in how successfully they limit this inefficiency. A method for ranking algorithms in computer science is adapted here to rank market mechanisms according to how quickly inefficiency diminishes as the size of the market increases. It is shown that trade at a single market-clearing price in the k-double auction is worst-case asymptotic optimal among all plausible mechanisms: evaluating mechanisms in their least favorable trading environments for each possible size of the market, the k-double auction is shown to force the worst-case inefficiency to zero at the fastest possible rate.