Population uncertainty, social insurance,
研究劳动人口规模不确定性对工资和资本回报的影响，并探讨未出生工人与未来退休者之间的保险合约是否对双方有利，发现代表性工人同时具有两种精算偏差时合约对双方有益。
Uncertainty in the size of the working population leads to uncertainty in wages and in the return to capital, and to the possible desirability of an insurance contract between unborn workers and future retirees. However Green (1977, 1988) finds that an insurance contract is unlikely to benefit both generations. We show that a worker has two potential sources of actuarial bias: Green's result is due to workers in his model being of different types and some workers having only one source of bias. A representative worker must have both sources of bias, and an insurance contract will benefit both generations. The results are generalized.