Hobbes to Rousseau: Inequality, Institutions and Development
研究经济和政治制度的内生演变及其与经济发展的相互依赖关系，发现法治和免于社会冲突的制度在均衡中出现，民主既非必要也非充分，高效寡头制可在群体共识下持续，且不平等与制度质量呈非单调关系。
This article studies the endogenous evolution of economic and political institutions and the interdependencies with the process of economic development. Favourable economic institutions in the form of a state of law and absence of societal conflict arise in equilibrium. Democracies are neither necessary nor sufficient to implement a state of law, even if they may be instrumental. Efficient oligarchies can emerge and persist supported by the consensus of all groups. A taxonomy of politico-economic equilibria shows the endogenous evolution of institutions depending on economic inequality and natural resource abundance, implying a non-monotonic relationship between inequality and institutional quality. © Journal compilation © 2008 by the Royal Economic Society.