The Limits of Transparency: Pitfalls and Potential of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest
综述研究发现，披露利益冲突反而让顾问更敢给出有偏建议，而客户不仅未能充分折扣偏见，还因担心显得不信任而更难以拒绝建议，并探讨了减少这些负面效应的政策干预。
We review evidence from our published and ongoing research that disclosing conflicts of interest has unintended consequences, helping conflicted advisors and harming their advisees: With disclosure, advisors feel comfortable giving more biased advice, but advisees do not properly adjust for this and generally fail to sufficiently discount biased advice. Disclosure also increases pressure on advisees to comply with advice; following disclosure, advisees feel more uncomfortable in turning down advice (e.g., it signals distrust of the advisor's motives). Finally, we examine the effectiveness of policy interventions aimed at reducing these unintended consequences and discuss how to realize potential benefits of disclosure.