Tradable deficit permits:efficient implementation of the Stability Pact in the European Monetary Union
借鉴环境市场经验，提出可交易赤字许可制度，让欧盟国家交易赤字权，以低成本、灵活透明的方式实现财政约束，并奖励赤字低于初始配额的成员国。
Summary Tradable deficit permits Efficient implementation of the Stability PactBorrowing from the experience of environmental markets, this paper proposes a system of tradable deficit permits as an efficient mechanism for implementing fiscal constraints in the European Monetary Union: having chosen an aggregate target for the Union and an initial distribution of permits, EMU countries could be allowed to trade rights to deficit creation. The scheme exploits countries’ incentives to minimize their costs, is transparent and flexible in accommodating idiosyncratic shocks and allows for adjustments in case of Europe-wide recessions. In addition, it need not treat all countries identically and can be designed to penalize countries with higher debt to GDP ratios. Finally, the scheme rewards countries for reducing their deficit below the initial allowance, lending credibility to the Stability Pact’s goal of a balanced budget in the medium run.— Alessandra Casella