Ideologues Beat Idealists
模型分析了两类候选人（坚持固定政策的意识形态者与执行多数事后选择的理想主义者）的选举竞争，发现意识形态者常胜出，即使损害所有选民，且无效率在策略投票时更普遍。
Our model considers a majority election between two candidates— an ideologue committed to a fixed policy and an idealist who implements the ex post choice of the majority. Voters are aware that their individual rankings of policies may change after the election according to common or idiosyncratic shocks. We show that in equilibrium the ideologue often beats the idealist, even when this choice hurts all voters. Inefficiency arises both for sincere and for strategic voters; we also show that it is more pervasive in the latter case. Groups may be inflexible even when each individual has a preference for flexibility.