Capital Controls, Political Risk, and Deviations from Interest-Rate Parity
证明，在预期未来资本管制的情况下，政治风险导致的利率差异主要取决于各国政府未偿债务总额以及世界财富在不同政治辖区居民间的分布。通过1970-1974年德国资本管制期间的欧洲马克利率与德国国内利率差异，模型将利差分解为现有管制的有效税收和预期管制的政治风险溢价。
It is shown that the interest differential due to political risk, given the prospect of future capital controls, depends essentially on the gross stocks of debt outstanding against different governments and the distribution of world wealth among residents of different political jurisdictions. A simple model of portfolio behavior is used to explain the differential between Euromark rates and interest rates within Germany in the presence of controls on capital flows into Germany between 1970 and 1974. The explanation separates the interest differential into the effective tax imposed by existing controls and a political risk premium associated with prospective controls.