Auctions with Constrained Information: Blind Bidding for Motion Pictures
通过模拟拍卖中的纳什均衡，发现电影放映商在无预映情况下盲拍可能导致预期效用损失，支持风险规避和竞争使放映商无法充分降低出价的假设。误差成分模型分析行业数据证实，盲拍影片的出价更低但收益方差更大。
Toward explaining why movie exhibitors have sought legislation requiring distributors to trade-screen films before soliciting bids, a simulation of a Nash equilibrium in an auction suggests that without previews bidders may suffer losses i n expected utility. This supports the hypothesis that risk aversion a nd competition render exhibitors unable to reduce their bids enough t o compensate fully for the dearth of information. An error-components model is used to analyze a unique industry dataset. The results conf irm that a component of the bid is lower (raising mean return), while the variance of return is greater for blindly-licensed films. Copyright 1988 by MIT Press.