Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly in Large Markets
分析了一个容量受限企业选择价格的伯特兰-埃奇沃思模型，证明随着企业数量增加，均衡价格收敛于完全竞争价格，但垄断价格仍以正概率出现，为完全竞争提供了基于价格形成的解释。
The relation between perfectly competitive and monopolistically competitive equilibria is analysed for a Bertrand-Edgeworth model of a single market in which capacity constrained firms choose prices as strategies. The market always has a Nash equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies. As the number of firms increases, the corresponding equilibria converge in distribution to a perfectly competitive price. This result provides a justification for perfect competition that is based on an explicit account of price formation. However, monopoly prices persist with a positive but vanishing probability. Regularity or well defined inverse demand functions are not required.