The Effects of Contracting, Litigation, Regulation, and Tax Costs on Conditional and Unconditional Conservatism: Cross-Sectional Evidence at the Firm Level
检验了合同、诉讼、监管和税收这四种因素对条件保守主义和无条件保守主义两种会计保守主义形式的不同影响，发现两者在合同、监管和税收中扮演不同角色，在诉讼中共同作用，且无条件保守主义会削弱条件保守主义，因此需要权衡。
Prior studies propose four explanations for accounting conservatism, and recent studies classify conservatism into two forms: conditional and unconditional conservatism. This paper examines whether each proposed explanation applies to conditional conservatism, unconditional conservatism, or both. The findings are as follows: (1) contracting induces conditional conservatism; (2) litigation induces both forms; (3) regulation induces unconditional conservatism; and (4) taxation induces unconditional conservatism. These findings indicate that the two forms of conservatism play distinct roles in contracting, regulation, and taxation, as well as a common role in litigation. They also play an interrelated role, as suggested by the finding that unconditional conservatism reduces conditional conservatism. The combined evidence implies that because the two forms meet distinct needs but are negatively interrelated, it is necessary to trade them off.