Dynamic Recapitalization Policies and the Role of Call Premia and Issue Discounts
研究公司资本重组政策，发现可赎回债券会导致股东过早重组，而赎回溢价和发行折价能缓解这一代理问题，并给出最优溢价和折价与公司风险正相关的实证支持。
In a dynamic framework, the advantage of leverage depends upon the firm's recapitalization policy. We show that if bonds are callable at par, then equityholders have an incentive to recapitalize too early. Call premia and issue discounts, however, mitigate the agency problem of early recapitalization. The model provides the optimal call premium and issue discount as a function of firm-specific characteristics. An analysis of a bond sample supports the model's prediction that the optimal call premium is positively related to firm risk.