Restoring Banking Stability: Beyond Supervised Capital Requirements
指出新兴经济体因信息不对称、政治干预和经济波动而频发金融危机，认为仅靠监管资本充足率不够，需改善银行家、监管者等参与者的激励结构，并辅以间歇性“钝器”工具来增强银行稳定性。
Emerging economies have been particularly prone to financial sector crises, reflecting marked information asymmetries and political interference, as well as the substantial volatility in underlying economic conditions, and the vulnerability of banking and finance when structural economic changes create a new and uncharted operating environment. The standard regulatory paradigm relies mainly on supervised capital adequacy, but it may not be enough. Other measures to improve the incentive structure for bankers, regulators, and other market participants could effectively increase the number of concerned, skilled and watchful eyes. Intermittent application of supplementary “blunt instruments” could also be useful.