Search, Layoffs, and Labor Market Equilibrium
扩展了工作搜寻理论，纳入解雇风险，并综合搜寻理论与隐性契约理论，构建了信息不完全和派生需求不确定下的劳动力市场均衡模型，解释搜寻性失业和解雇性失业。
The paper has two purposes: (1) to extend the theory of job search to include the case in which job prospects are characterized by layoff risk as well as the wage and (2) to synthesize the search and implicit-contract approaches by using the former to model the supply side and the latter to model the demand side of a labor market. The result is a simple and consistent theory of labor market equilibrium under conditions of imperfect information and uncertain derived demand. The theory purports to explain both search and layoff unemployment as market equilibrium phenomena.