Price Behavior in a Dynamic Oligopsony: Washington Processing Potatoes
利用动态体制转换模型检验华盛顿州马铃薯加工商之间的默契合谋行为，发现惩罚和合谋体制确实存在，且加工商的反竞争行为造成了显著的福利损失。
Abstract Punishment strategies are necessary to sustain a collusive oligopsony in a repeated game context when demand is uncertain and only market variables are observable. This article proposes a test for tacit collusion among potato processors in Washington state using a dynamic regime‐switching model estimated with a finite mixture method. The results support the existence of punishment and collusive regimes and show the welfare losses due to anti‐competitive behavior on the part of processors to be significant. Processors' oligopsony power is enhanced by higher domestic production, imports, and existing stocks, but it is ameliorated by high capacity utilization rates and exports.