Political and Industrial Change in a Model of Trade Union Militancy and Real Wage Growth
构建了一个工会斗争性与实际工资变动相互作用的工资生成模型，阐明了宏观政治变量和产业构成变化在工资决定中的作用，并解释了为何失业上升与实际工资加速增长可能提高工会斗争性。对西德数据的实证结果支持该模型，强调应将劳动斗争性视为与多个指标相关且可能存在测量误差的潜在不可观测变量。
The paper forwards an analytical formulation of the wage generating process in which trade union militancy and real wage movements interact. Key features of the advanced model are (1) a clarification of the role of macropolitical variables and of changing industrial composition in the wage determination process and (2) a simple explanation of why increasing unemployment and accelerating real wage growth may raise trade union militancy. The empirical results obtained for West Germany support the proposed model and stress the importance of treating labor militancy as a latent, unobservable variable which relates to multiple indicators and may be subject to measurement errors.