Trade Association Disclosure Rules, Incentives to Share Information, and Welfare
用垄断竞争模型分析行业协会的不同披露规则如何影响企业信息共享激励，以及对社会福利的影响。研究发现，非排他性披露会破坏信息共享激励，而排他性披露则能保留激励；在古诺竞争下信息共享提高总剩余，在伯特兰竞争下则降低。
In this article I propose a monopolistic competition framework to analyze the effects of different disclosure rules used by trade associations on the incentives to share information and on the welfare of consumers, firms, and society. This framework is appropriate whenever a single firm cannot influence aggregate market magnitudes, and serves as a benchmark for the analysis of information-pooling agreements abstracting from strategic considerations. I report two main results. First, a policy of nonexclusionary disclosure destroys the incentives to share information, while exclusionary disclosure preserves them. Second, information sharing increases expected total surplus with Cournot competition but decreases it with Bertrand competition in the context of a Quadratic-Normal model with demand uncertainty.