Total Board Remuneration and Company Performance
利用英国数据，将高管薪酬与股票期权结合，发现高管薪酬对公司绩效的敏感性比以往研究更高，并质疑了英国机构投资者和格林伯里委员会对股票期权的政策立场。
Using a hitherto neglected source of data, this paper combines executive emoluments with executive options to construct a broader measure of executive pay than has been possible in earlier British studies. The result of including the long-term share option component of pay along with the more commonly utilized short-term component of emoluments is to reveal executive pay as being significantly more sensitive to company performance than has previously been thought to be the case. The paper questions the current policy stance of British institutional investors and of the Greenbury Committee with respect to executive share options. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.