Do Banks Value Innovation? Evidence from US Firms
研究企业创新如何缓解关系贷款中的信息不对称问题，发现创新能力强的企业（专利多、研发效率高或专利质量高）能获得更低的银行贷款利差和更优的非价格贷款条款，且对小企业或研发投入较少的企业效果更明显。
This study evaluates how innovation within companies alleviates the information asymmetry problems in relationship lending. We hypothesize that patenting activities could reveal favorable private information and, hence, reduce the information asymmetry between innovative borrowers and banks. Using a sample of US patenting firms from 1987 to 2004, we show that borrowers with higher innovation capability (revealed by having more patent applications, higher research & development (R&D) productivity, or higher‐quality patents) enjoy lower bank‐loan spreads and better nonprice‐related loan terms. Our evidence further suggests that the information benefits of patenting activities on loan spreads is more pronounced for small or less R&D‐intensive firms.