Pricing of Seasoned Equity Offers and Earnings Management
研究成熟股票发行公司通过盈余管理推高发行价、降低抑价程度的现象，为理解发行定价与会计操纵的关系提供证据。
Abstract This study examines the relations between earnings management by firms offering seasoned equity issues and the pricing of their offers. We hypothesize that seasoned equity offering (SEO) firms that employ aggressive accounting decisions also more aggressively push up their offer prices, thereby leading to a decrease in the degree of underpricing. Consistent with our prediction (the issuer's greed hypothesis), evidence indicates that SEO firms that make opportunistic accounting decisions issue new shares at inflated prices. Our findings remain robust after controlling for other determinants of SEO underpricing and the possible endogeneity of pricing and earnings management.