FIRST IN VILLAGE OR SECOND IN ROME?*
研究个体在偏好高质量同伴与追求群体内高地位之间的权衡，发现人才分选形成重叠区间结构，均衡中隔离与混合并存，且组织内平等化会加剧组织间隔离但可能提升效率。
Though individuals prefer high‐quality peers, there are advantages to being high up in the pecking order within a group. In this environment, sorting of agents yields an overlapping interval structure in the type space. Segregation and mixing coexist in a stable equilibrium. With transfers, this equilibrium corresponds to a competitive equilibrium where agents bid for relative positions and entails less segregation than the efficient allocation. More egalitarianism within organizations induces greater segregation across organizations, but can improve the allocation efficiency. Since competition is most intense for intermediate talent, effective personnel policies differ systematically between high‐quality and low‐quality organizations.