Political strategies of regulated organizations as functions of context and fear
研究利用营利、非营利和公共组织的调查数据，发现组织情境（如规模、依赖性）对信息型影响策略有显著正向作用，但对施压策略无显著影响；对政府报复的恐惧则与信息型策略负相关、与施压策略正相关。
Abstract Data from representative privately owned profit‐making, privately owned non‐profit and publicly owned non‐profit organizations are used to determine differences in influence strategy and whether organizational context (e.g. size, dependence) and fear are significant explanatory variables for variation in influence strategies across industries. Extending ‘power‐dependence theory’ to conditions of vertical interdependence between regulated organizations and regulatory agencies, the present study finds support for the hypotheses that context has a significant positive effect on information based influence strategies, but no significant effect on pressure strategies of influence. Further, fear of government retaliation is found to be related negatively to information based influence strategies and related positively to pressure strategies. Implications for further theoretical development and private and public policy are drawn.