Oligopoly Price Discrimination and Resale Price Maintenance
研究零售市场寡头价格歧视如何阻碍制造商通过批发价实现最优零售利润，进而促使制造商采用转售价格维持，并分析其福利效应。
Oligopoly price discrimination in the retail market prevents a manufacturer from inducing optimal retail margins through any wholesale price. This motivates the manufacturer to impose resale price maintenance. In a model of third-degree price discrimination by rival retailers, a retail price ceiling (or floor) enables the manufacturer to restore the first best. Imposing a fixed retail price is generally not optimal because the manufacturer wants to eliminate price discrimination based on consumers’ abilities to switch retailers, not based on consumers’ valuations. Under resale price maintenance, welfare may either increase or decrease, and it may increase even when total output is reduced.