The impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on contributions in best-shot public good games
研究了在最佳射击公共品博弈中，禀赋的异质性和来源如何影响参与者的贡献行为，发现财富来源在不对称情境下可能起作用。
Abstract Economists and psychologists have long argued the origin of wealth influences individual behavior. In a previous study (Cherry et al., 2005), we found the origin of endowment did not significantly affect behavior in linear public good games with summation contribution technology. In such games, however, both Nash behavior (everybody gives nothing) and social optimal behavior (everybody gives the entire endowment) call for symmetric levels of contributions. Results from this new study indicate that the origin of wealth might matter in more asymmetric situations, such as in a best-shot public good game with heterogeneous groups.