Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets?
实证检验了收购的一种动机：更换那些通过收购损害自身股权价值的公司控制权。研究发现，后来成为收购目标的公司其收购行为显著降低了股权价值，而未成为目标的公司则提升了股权价值。
This paper empirically examines one motive for takeovers: to change control of firms that make acquisitions that diminish the value of their equity. Firms that subsequently become takeover targets make acquisitions that significantly reduce their equity value, and firms that do not become takeover targets make acquisitions that raise their equity value. Within the sample of acquisitions by targets, the acquisitions that reduce equity value the most are those that are later divested either in bust-up takeovers or restructuring programs to thwart the takeover. This evidence is consistent with theories advanced by Robin Marris (1963), Henry G. Manne (1965), and Michael C. Jensen (1986) concerning the disciplinary role played by takeovers. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.