Cross‐Listing, Bonding Hypothesis and Corporate Governance
研究1997-2003年加拿大公司在美国交叉上市后公司治理的变化，发现交叉上市后董事会和审计委员会更独立，所有权结构改变，且估值对审计委员会独立性和所有权结构的敏感性增强。
Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between cross‐listing and corporate governance for Canadian firms, that were cross‐listed on US stock exchanges during the period 1997–2003. We find that cross‐listed firms have more independent boards and audit committees after the listing relative to a non‐cross‐listed matched sample of firms and relative to the pre‐listing period. Moreover, cross‐listed firms experience changes in their ownership structure after the listing. Finally, we provide evidence that the sensitivity of the relation between cross‐listed firm valuation with audit committee independence and ownership structure becomes more important after the listing. The results are robust after adjusting for various firm risk characteristics. Overall, the results are consistent with the literature on the bonding role of cross‐listings on US stock exchanges.