The IPO and first seasoned equity sale: Issue proceeds, owner/managers' wealth, and the underpricing signal
检验了高质量公司通过IPO抑价来传递信号、以便在后续增发中获得更好市场反应的假说，发现1987-1991年间172家工业公司的数据不支持该假说。
Recent models of IPO underpricing suggest that high-quality firms underprice their IPOs to differentiate themselves from low-quality firms and, thus, receive a more favorable market response to subsequent equity offerings. We test this suggestion for 172 industrial firms that made an initial public offering during 1987–1991 and made a subsequent seasoned equity offering within three years of their IPO. We examine two measures of the impact of the hypothesized underpricing signal net of the cost of employing that signal. Inconsistent with the underpricing signal hypothesis, we find no evidence that firms recover the cost of an underpriced IPO in either higher issue proceeds or in greater wealth for the firm's initial owners.