An Empirical Investigation of the Strategic Use of Debt
研究瑞典地方政府债务积累，发现右翼政府面临败选概率高时增加债务，左翼政府则相反，结果与Persson和Svensson的战略债务模型一致。
The paper examines the accumulation of debt by Swedish local governments. I find that right-wing governments accumulate more debt when facing a higher probability of defeat, whereas the opposite occurs for left-wing governments. These effects are sizable: a right-wing government increases its level of debt by 15 percent, whereas a left-wing government decreases its debt by 11 percent if they are both certain of being replaced as compared to when they are certain of remaining in office. The results are consistent with the predictions from a strategic debt model developed by Persson and Svensson.