Predicting the Winner's Curse
针对固定报价的一级密封价格拍卖中数量不确定导致的赢家诅咒问题，提出一种预测最高竞争报价和数量偏差的实证方法，并用木材拍卖数据演示。
ABSTRACT If quantity uncertainty exists in a first price auction that specifies a fixed bid, a participant must answer two questions when evaluating a candidate bid: “What are my chances of winning?” and “What is the effect of the winner's curse on my quantity estimate?” The winner's curse is the tendency of the winner of a first‐price sealed‐bid auction to be the bidder that most overvalues the items being offered. When value uncertainty is due to quantity uncertainty, the winner's curse implies that the bidder that most overestimates the quantity tends to win. Thus, if there is quantity uncertainty, a participant must adjust its bid for this tendency to overestimate quantities. This paper presents an empirical method to answer the above questions by estimating a predictive distribution of the highest competing bid and the quantity bias caused by the winner's curse. The method is developed for timber auctions but is general to auctions where a fixed bid is called for and there is uncertainty in the mix and quantities of items being offered. An example that uses data from timber auctions is used to demonstrate the method.