The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives
研究所有权与经营权分离的企业在寡头市场中如何选择管理激励，发现利润最大化行为不会出现，且数量竞争更接近完全竞争、价格竞争更接近合谋行为。
Do firms with separate owners and managers maximize profits? We address this question for an oligopoly where managers compete in quantities or prices, as in the Cournot or Bertrand models, and owners choose their managers' incentives. We find that there is a strategic aspect in the problem of selecting incentives and that profit-maximizing behavior does not result. In particular, in the oligopoly we study, the behavior of firms competing in quantity (price) more closely resembles perfectly competitive (collusive) behavior than Cournot (Bertrand) behavior.