Competitive Banking, Bankers' Clubs, and Bank Regulation
重新审视银行监管和中央银行的起源，认为它们并非为应对市场失灵而自发产生，而是与银行家俱乐部施加的规则不同，且不太可能从自由银行制度中自然出现。
This paper reexamines the view that banking regulation and central banking arose to counter market 'failures.' It investigates the factors that led bankers to form clubs and examines the 'regulations' imposed by clubs on their members. It suggests that such regulation is different from real-world regulation and central banking and would be unlikely to arise spontaneously from free banking anyway. It also suggests that this view is consistent with available evidence and compares it with the alternative views of Gary Gorton and Donald J. Mullineaux (1987), and of Charles A. E. Goodhart. Copyright 1994 by Ohio State University Press.