Inequity Aversion May Increase Inequity
通过博弈模型证明，在不需要全体一致同意的谈判中，不平等厌恶反而可能加剧收益分配的不对称，因为回应者宁愿接受较低份额也不愿被排除在外。
Inequity aversion models have been used to explain equitable payoff divisions in bargaining games. I show that inequity aversion can actually "increase" the asymmetry of payoff division if unanimity is not required. This is because responders may be willing to accept a lower share rather than risk being left out. Inequity aversion may also affect comparative statics: the advantage of being the proposer can "decrease" as players become more impatient. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007.