How CEOs protect themselves against dismissal: A social status perspective
研究CEO的社会地位如何影响其在业绩下滑时的去留，发现CEO相对于董事长的地位越高越不易被解雇，但董事会外部网络成员的突出地位会削弱这一保护作用。
In this study, we address the question of why some CEOs stay in office during a performance downturn while others don't. Taking a social status perspective, we argue that an individual's board network embeddedness—as reflected in the number of outside directorships—plays an important role in dismissal decisions. We predict that a high status of the CEO relative to the chairman of the board protects an underperforming CEO against dismissal, while the relative salience of board network outsiders can counter this effect. Using longitudinal data of large German corporations, we find support for our predictions. Ltd. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.