Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
设计了一个机制，其纳什均衡结果与多私人物品经济中的林达尔配置一致，且该机制的结果函数是单值、可行且连续的。当经济中没有公共物品时，该机制也能实现受约束的瓦尔拉斯对应。
This paper considers the problem of designing mechanisms whose Nash allocations coincide with the Lindahl allocations for public goods economies with more than one private good. Unlike previous mechanisms, the mechanism presented here has a single-valued, feasible, and continuous outcome function. Furthermore, when there are no public goods in economies, feasible and continuous implementation of the (constrained) Walrasian correspondence can be obtained as a corollary of our Theorem 1.