Discretionary Inflation in a General Equilibrium Model
将Barro-Gordon模型扩展到一般均衡框架，分析经济特征如何影响通胀偏差，发现通胀激励增加不一定恶化偏差，实际利率和劳动收入份额也会影响相机抉择通胀水平。
This paper extends the Barro and Gordon (1983) model to a general equilibrium framework in which the costs and benefits to surprise inflation reflect the preferences, technology, and market structure of the economy. The benefit of such an approach is that we can relate the underlying features of the economy to the size of the inflation bias. In particular, it can be shown that an increase in the source of the monetary authority's incentive to inflate does not necessarily result in a worsened inflation bias due to offsetting changes in the cost of inflation. Furthermore, changes in the real interest rate affect the monetary authority's incentives and hence the discretionary level of inflation. Lastly, we can show that an increase in the labor share of national income worsens the inflation bias. The model also indicates the importance of a nominal rigidity, lack of policy precommitment, and a distortion for optimal monetary policy to be characterized by a level of discretionary inflation that exceeds the Friedman (1969) rule.