The Observational Implications of Labor Contracts in a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model
研究劳动合同如何在不改变实际资源配置的情况下，使均衡看起来不同，例如长期雇佣合同产生的工资观测值会偏离理论市场工资，有助于解释数据中看似异常的现象。
Economies are studied where labor contracts, even without changing real allocations, can make equilibria appear different. One basic example is that wage observations generated by long-term employment contracts are biased measures of theoretical market wages. This idea is analyzed in a dynamic, stochastic, economic model, including both overlapping generations of finite-lived workers and infinite-horizon employers, so that the implications for business cycle, life cycle, and cross-sectional phenomena can be explicitly addressed. Understanding contracts in thi s way potentially allows one to reconcile several ostensibly anomalous aspects of the data with equilibrium theory. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.