Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior
研究多市场接触如何影响企业间的合作程度，在重复竞争环境下分析多市场接触促进合谋的条件，并指出这些合谋行为模式与以往实证研究一致。
Traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions, concentration, and barriers-to-entry. Nevertheless, some economists have remained concerned that external factors, such as contact across markets, may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry. In this article, we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition. We isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms.