Disability Retirement in a Welfare State
研究了挪威长期病假者中经济激励对残疾退休决策的影响，发现工资的激励效应大于福利的抑制效应，且主观诊断不影响残疾退休概率。
The increasing number of disability pensioners may put a strain on the welfare state. In this paper, we try to assess the effect of financial incentives on disability entrance. A sample of Norwegians on long‐term sick leave at the beginning of 1989 is examined as of the end of 1989, and the exit routes are studied in a multinomial logit model. The results indicate that the incentive effects of wages are larger than the disincentive effects of benefits. Furthermore, there is no evidence that having a “subjective” diagnosis affects the probability of becoming a disability pensioner.