Information Incentives and Contract Timing Patterns
解释美国工资合同集中签订的时间模式，认为这是竞争与垄断竞争产品市场中代理人利用他人时间决策信息的结果，信息动机导致交错签约，而市场异质性促成集中均衡。
A prominent feature of wage contracting in the United States is the bunched timing pattern that is often associated with the process of pattern bargaining. The model describes the bunching of wage contracts as the equilibrium outcome of decentralized decisions in an economy composed of both competitive and monopolistically competitive product markets. Agents time their wage adjustment to take advantage of the information associated with the timing decisions of others; this information-based motive leads to staggered contracting. A bunching equilibrium requires the presence of heterogeneous product markets and occurs because the information transmitted by contracting agents differs across the market structures. Copyright 1990 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.