反垄断和解与审判结果

Antitrust Settlements and Trial Outcomes

Review of Economics and Statistics · 1996
被引 45
人大 AFT50ABS 4

中文导读

通过联合估计和解与审判结果的模型,发现原告胜诉概率每增加1%,和解概率提高0.13%;被告声誉效应不显著,且原告倾向于在有利司法管辖区起诉。

Abstract

Risk aversion plays an important role in explaining why antitrust cases settle instead of going to trial. Using a jointly estimated model of settlement and trial outcome, the authors find that a one percent increase in the probability that the plaintiff wins at trial raises the probability of a settlement by 0.13 percent. They also find that reputation effects are not a significant factor for defendants, so the risk aversion of the defendants does not play a dominant role in determining whether the parties settle. Plaintiffs are more likely to win in certain jurisdictions, which encourages venue shopping by plaintiffs. Copyright 1996 by MIT Press.

反垄断和解审判结果风险规避择地行诉