A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation
研究基于可转移效用博弈的非合作多边讨价还价模型，区分协议可逆与不可逆情形，分析联盟形成过程，发现可逆时总会形成大联盟，而核心为空时大联盟无法一步形成。
We study noncooperative multilateral bargaining games, based on underlying TU games, in which coalitions can renegotiate their agreements. We distinguish between models in which players continue to bargain after implementing agreements ("reversible actions") and models in which players who implement agreements must leave the game ("irreversible actions"). We show that renegotiation always results in formation of the grand coalition if actions are reversible, but that the process may otherwise end with smaller coalitions. On the other hand, we show that the grand coalition cannot form in one step if the core of the game is empty, irrespective of the reversibility of actions.