The Vulnerability of Auctions to Bidder Collusion
研究不同拍卖机制对竞标者合谋的脆弱性，发现升价拍卖和第二价格拍卖的细节设计（如注册程序和信息披露）可以完全抑制或无意中促进某些类型的合谋。
Previous work has addressed the relative vulnerability of different auction schemes to collusive bidding. The common wisdom is that ascending-bid and second-price auctions are highly susceptible to collusion. We show that the details of ascending-bid and second-price auctions, including bidder registration procedures and procedures for information revelation during the auction, can be designed to completely inhibit, or unintentionally facilitate, certain types of collusion. If auctions are designed without acknowledging the possibility of collusion then the design will ignore key features that impact the potential success of colluding bidders.