On the Informational Role of Quantities: Durable Goods and Consumers' Word- of-Mouth Communication
构建动态不完全信息博弈模型，研究消费者通过口碑学习耐用品质量时，企业如何通过销售数量策略传递质量信号，高销量减少未来买家但提升信息质量，低质量企业采取“打一枪就跑”策略。
A dynamic incomplete information game is set up to study the introduction of a durable good when consumers can learn its quality from previous buyers. High sales today imply fewer potential buyers tomorrow, but each buyer will have better information about the good. Consumers are fully rational and can update their beliefs, even when they do not directly receive information; in equilibrium, no news is bad news. A low-quality firm follows a 'fly-by-night' strategy, randomizing over the timing of sales. A high-quality firm spreads out its sales more smoothly, solving a stochastic dynamic programming problem. Copyright 1997 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.