Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services Political Action Committees
提出利益集团竞争如何塑造国会组织的理论，并用金融服务领域政治行动委员会的竞选捐款数据验证，发现专门常设委员会促进利益集团与议员的重复博弈，从而支持高捐款和高立法努力。
The authors develop a positive theory of how interest-group competition shapes the organization of Congress and use it to explain campaign contribution patterns in financial services. Since interest groups cannot enforce fee-for-service contracts with legislators, legislators have an incentive to create specialized, standing committees which foster repeated dealing between interests and committee members. The resulting reputational equilibrium supports high contributions and high legislative effort for the interests. Contribution patterns by competing interests in the congressional battle over whether banks can enter new businesses support the theory, which also has implications for term limits and campaign reform. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.