Does retailer power lead to exclusion?
研究了零售商议价能力和上架费是否会导致小制造商被排斥在分销渠道之外，发现只要全分销是行业利润最大化的结果，就存在实现全分销的均衡。
This article examines whether retailer bargaining power and upfront slotting allowances prevent small manufacturers (who have no bargaining power) from obtaining adequate distribution. In contrast to the findings of Marx and Shaffer (2007) , who show that all equilibria involve limited distribution (i.e., exclusion of a retailer), we show that there is always an equilibrium in which full distribution is obtained, provided that full distribution is the industry profit‐maximizing outcome. The key feature leading to this differing result is that we do not restrict each retailer to offering the manufacturer a single tariff.