Optimal Area‐Yield Crop Insurance Reconsidered
研究了在农户与保险公司信息对称和不对称情况下，区域产量保险合同的可行性，发现完全保险合同在信息不对称时易受逆向选择影响，并刻画了最优合同特征。
The implementability of area‐yield insurance contracts in the presence of symmetric and asymmetric information about the farmer's “beta” linking his yield to the risk‐pool's yield is examined. In the presence of fixed costs and symmetric information Mahul's result that optimality requires setting the slope of the indemnity schedule equal to each farmer's beta is confirmed. When there is asymmetric information between the insurer and the farmer, however, this full‐insurance contract is vulnerable to adverse selection, and therefore may not be implementable for general cost structures. The optimal area‐yield insurance contract under asymmetric information is characterized.